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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND OF THE PRESS-RIGHT
OF PRIVACY-THE

PRESS MAY PUBLISH ANY

MATTER OF PUBLIC INTEREST

UNLESS WITH KNOWLEDGE OF ITS FALSITY OR IN RECKLESS DISREGARD OF ITS

, 87 Sup. Ct. 534
U.S. (1967), the United States Supreme Court was confronted with the question
of whether publishing a "fictionalized" version of an incident which made
a private citizen an involuntary subject of public interest constituted an
invasion of his right of privacy. The Court held that reports concerning
newsworthy persons and events are in the public interest and are protected
by the first amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and press unless
they are published with knowledge of their falsity or in reckless disregard
of their truth.
TRUTH.-In the case of Time, Inc. v. Hill, -

In 1952, the plaintiff, James J. Hill, and his family, were held hostage
in their suburban home for nineteen hours by three escaped convicts. After
the convicts departed, the plaintiff stressed to newsmen that the convicts
had not mistreated or harmed either him or his family in any way. Shortly
thereafter, the family moved to another state and discouraged all efforts
to keep them in the public spotlight. The next year, inspired by the original
newspaper accounts of this ordeal, James Hayes wrote a novel entitled The
Desperate Hours, which depicted a similar experience to that suffered by
the plaintiff, but in this version the family suffered violence at the hands
of their captors. Later, this book was made into a play of the same title
and, in conjunction with the play, the defendant, Time, Inc. published
an article in its Life magazine entitled "True Crime Inspires Tense Play."
Although the plaintiff had never been named in the book or play, the
defendant stated that the public could now see the re-enacted story of the
"desperate ordeal of the James Hill family." The article also included
pictures taken at the plaintiff's former house with actors from the play
posing in scenes showing the violence of the convicts.
The plaintiff brought an action against the defendant under the New
York right of privacy statute,' asserting that the article gave the impression
that the play mirrored the family's experience, which the defendant knew
to be false and untrue. The State Supreme Court, Trial Term, held for the
plaintiff, and the Appellate Division 2 affirmed the Trial Term as to liability
but remanded the case for a new trial as to damages. On remand, the Trial
Term reduced the damages and entered judgment for the plaintiff, where1 McKinney's Consol. Laws ch. 6, §§ 50-51 (1903). These statutes, labeled "right of
privacy," state that the use of the name, portrait or picture of any living person for
trade or advertising purposes without the written consent of such person is a misdemeanor
and the injured party may seek injunctive relief and compensatory damages, as well as
exemplary damages, if the defendant".., knowingly used such a person's name,
portrait or picture. ..."

2 Time, Inc. v. Hill, 18 App. Div. 2d 485, 240 N.Y.S.2d 286 (1963).
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upon the New York Court of Appeals " affirmed. The Supreme Court of
the United States, in a six to three decision, set aside the judgment and
4
remanded the case for a new trial.
In the trial court, the jury was instructed that a verdict for liability
under the statute5 could rest only on a finding that the defendant had so
altered or changed the facts concerning the plaintiff's relationship to the
play that the article was a "fictionalized" version for trade purposes rather
than for dissemination of news. The court also instructed the jury that an
award of punitive damages was justified if they found the defendant had
falsely connected the plaintiff to the play "knowingly or through failure to
make reasonable investigation," adding that a finding of ill will or personal
malice was not necessary if they found a reckless or wanton disregard of the
plaintiff's rights. On appeal, the United States Supreme Court concentrated
its attention on whether the instructions were in accord with the constitutional safeguards of the first amendment.
The concept that individuals have a right of privacy was given impetus
by Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis in their famous article 6 in the
Harvard Law Review. Since that time, recovery for tortious interference
of privacy has been recognized at common law in thirty states plus the
7
District of Columbia, and by statute in four other states.
Independent of statute, the law of privacy comprises four distinct kinds
of invasions, each involving different interests of the plaintiff. Thus, the
invasion of the right of privacy is not one tort but a complex of four. These
include an intrusion on the plaintiff's solitude which would be offensive to
the reasonable man, a public disclosure of private facts of a highly objectionable kind about the plaintiff, a presentation of the plaintiff in a false
light in the public eye, and an appropriation of the plaintiff's name or like8
ness by the defendant for his own benefit or advantage.
Previous to the recognition of the torts relating to the protection of
the right of privacy of individuals, however, the first amendment of the
Constitution provided that Congress (and later the States, through the
fourteenth amendment) could pass no law abridging the right of freedom
of speech and of the press. This constitutional guarantee was soon found not
to be absolute, but rather the states were empowered to punish abuses
thereof.9
New York was first to pass a statute' 0 to protect the right of privacy
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 15 N.Y.2d 986, 207 N.E.2d 604 (1965).
Time, Inc. v. Hill, U.S. , 87 Sup. Ct. 534 (1967).
Supra note 1.
Warren and Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890).
7 See Prosser, Torts 831-32 (3d ed. 1964).
8 Id. at 833-51.
9 See, e.g., Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 51 Sup. Ct. 625 (1931).
10 McKinney's Consol. Laws ch. 6, §§ 50-51 (1903).
3
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6
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of its citizens. Although it specifically provides that appropriation and use
of another's name, portrait or picture without his consent, for advertising
or trade purposes, is a tort and misdemeanor, the New York courts have
given the statute a much broader application to include a general right of
privacy."
The New York courts, however, have also recognized that there must
be some restrictions on this right of privacy.
One of the clearest exceptions to the statutory prohibition is the
rule that a public figure, whether he be such by choice or involuntarily, is subject to the often searching beam of publicity and that,
in balance with the legitimate public interest, the law affords his
privacy little protection.12
Even when dealing with public figures, however, the press is bound
3
by certain standards regarding truth. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,1
a public official in Alabama brought a libel action against the defendant
newspaper for publishing a civil rights movement advertisement which
criticized the administration of justice in Montgomery, Alabama. The
Supreme Court reversed the Alabama state decision in favor of the plaintiff,
holding that the Alabama court failed to apply the necessary safeguards for
freedom of speech and press. The Court said:
The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule
that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves
that the statement was made with "actual malice"-that is, with
knowledge that it4 was false or with reckless disregard of whether it
was false or not.'
Thus, the Supreme Court held that the Constitution delimits a state's power
to award damages for libel in actions brought by public officials against
critics of their official conduct.
In Garrison v. State of Louisiana,'5 the Court further recognized and
explained the standard in the New York Times case and held that a state
could not punish false statements concerning public officials unless they
were made with knowledge of their falsity or in reckless disregard of their
truth.
After these decisions, the New York courts adopted a narrow construction of the New York Times and Garrison decisions. In Spahn v.
Julian Messner, Inc.,16 a well known professional baseball pitcher brought
11 Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 18 N.Y.2d 324, 221 N.E.2d 543 (1966).
12 Id. at 328, 221 N.E.2d at 545 (Emphasis added).
13 376 U.S. 254, 84 Sup. Ct. 710 (1964).
14 Id. at 275, 84 Sup. Ct. at 7261 (Emphasis added).
15 379 U.S. 64, 85 Sup. Ct. 209 (1964).
16 18 N.Y.2d 324, 221 N.E.2d 543 (1966).
Editor's Note: Subsequent to this issue going to press, Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc.
87 Sup.
U.S. -,
has been vacated and remanded to the New York Court of Appeals, Ct. 1706 (1967), in light of Time, Inc. v. Hill.
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an action for invasion of his privacy under the New York right of privacy
statutes for the publication of a fictionalized biography. The New York
Court of Appeals held the plaintiff entitled to relief and distinguished the
New York Times case on the grounds that Spahn concerned a private
individual, not a public official. While recognizing that comment on a
public figure may be privileged, the court held that this privilege does not
include the use of a person's name, picture or portrait in a "fictitious"
17
report or article.
When the Hill case came up on appeal from the New York courts,
which awarded the plaintiff (a private individual) relief for the "fictionalized version of his ordeal," the Supreme Court ruled:
We hold that the constitutional protections for speech and press
preclude the application of the New York statute to redress false
reports of matters of public interest in the absence of proof that
the defendant published the report with knowledge of its falsity
or in reckless disregard of the truth.'8
Thus, the net effect of the Hill decision was to apply the test in the
New York Times case, which was a libel action brought by a public official,
to cases where private individuals, who are the involuntary subjects of
public interest, seek redress from false accounts about their experiences.
The Court denies this result, but herein lies the failing of the Hill decision.
As the Court stated:
We find applicable here the standard of knowing or reckless falsehood not through blind application of New York Times v. Sullivan, relating solely to libel actions by public officials, but only
upon consideration of the factors which arise in the particular context of the application of the New York statute in cases involving
private individuals. This is neither a libel action by a private individual nor a statutory action by a public official. Therefore, although the First Amendment principles pronounced in New York
Times guide our conclusion, we reach that conclusion only by
applying these principles in this discrete context. It therefore serves
no purpose to distinguish the facts here from those in New York
Times.19
From the Hill case and its forerunners in precedent, it is clear that the

Supreme Court has never found independent value in false publications,
but has protected them solely to give "breathing space" to the truth, recognizing that erroneous statements are inevitable in free debate. In application though, this principle has been limited in cases involving public
officials, where the public requires information on the truth even if such
20
is contained in half-truths and misinformation.
17 See also Youssoupoff v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 19 App. Div. 2d 865,
244 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1965); Binns v. Vitagraph Co., 201 N.Y. 21, 103 N.E. 1108 (1913).
U.S.
,
, 87 Sup. Ct. 534, 542 (1967) (Emphasis
18 Time, Inc v. Hill, added).
87 Sup. Ct. at 543.
19 Id. at -,
20 Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 66 Sup. Ct. 1029 (1946).
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Breathing space regarding comment on public officials, however, is
quite different from comment on private citizens who are the involuntary
subjects of public interest. As Mr. Justice Harlan stated, dissenting in part:
IT]here is a vast difference in the state interest in protecting indi[..
viduals like Mr. Hill from irresponsibly prepared publicity and the
state interest in similar protection for a public official .... Mr. Hill
came to public attention through an unfortunate circumstance not
of his making, rather than his voluntary actions and he can in no
State
sense be considered to have "waived" any protection the
21
might justifiably afford him from irresponsible publicity.
When dealing with the guarantees of the First Amendment, it is necessary to find sufficient public interest to justify the invasion of the privacy
of individuals. The identity of the individuals and their connection with
society is crucial to this determination and it would be useful if at least
three distinct classes of persons were recognized for this purpose.
Public officials, elected or appointed to serve the public, should enjoy
the least protection of privacy due to the effect of their actions on the
public and the trust reposed in them by their constituency. For these
persons, the standard in the New York Times case of "knowingly false or in
reckless disregard of the truth" is justifiable to establish a test of liability for
22
those who publish articles concerning them.
Next are the private individuals who, by their fame, mode of living,
or occupation, voluntarily place themselves in the public spotlight and
thus are open to reasonable public scrutiny. These individuals require
more protection from irresponsible publicity than public officials and an
affirmative duty should be placed on those who publish articles about them
to make a reasonable search for the truth. If an article is shown by the
plaintiff to be false, the defendant should be held liable if he fails to prove
there was such a reasonable search.
The third class of persons, the involuntary subjects of public attention
and interest, like the plaintiff in the Hill case, require the greatest protection of their right of privacy. Those who publish articles about such persons should be held to a standard of absolute truth, with liability to follow
upon proof by the plaintiff of false statements.
87 Sup. Ct. at 552-53.
Supra note 18, at -,
Dictum in Pauling v. News Syndicate Co., 335 F.2d 659 (1964), indicates one court's
view that the right to comment, unless the comment was made knowingly false or in
reckless disregard of the truth, may in the future be extended to allow comment on any
person involved in public issues whether he be a public official or not. The court stated
at p. 671:
The "profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open," now applied to confer
immunity on' "vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on
government and public officials," 376 U.S. at 270, 84 Sup. Ct. at 721, may some day
be found to demand still further erosion of the protection heretofore given by the
law of defamation. (Nobel prize winning biochemist).
21
22
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Regardless of the merits of these suggestions, it is clear that while
the standard in the New York Times case of knowing or reckless falsehood
may be reasonable when dealing with public officials, such a requirement,
which is tantamount to a finding of malice, is clearly too severe to apply
to persons who are the involuntary subjects of public interest. Often such
individuals, as the plaintiff here, already have suffered greatly from circumstances which gave them prominence in the public eye and, therefore,
should not be exposed to additional invasions of their privacy by false
reports of their tribulations without a suitable means of redress.
Private citizens, as Judge Cooley observed in 1888, have "the right
to be let alone"'2 and that right should not be jeopardized by a standard
which equates the rights of privacy of one who seeks the public spotlight
with one who purposely walks in its shadow.
RICHARD A. BRAUN

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-SELF-INCRIMINATION-REFUSAL

OF

ATTORNEY

TO PRODUCE DEMANDED FINANCIAL RECORDS AND TO TESTIFY IN A DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING

ON GROUND THAT THE RECORDS

AND TESTIMONY WOULD

TEND TO INCRIMINATE HIM NOT GROUND FOR DISBARMENT.-In

the case of

Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. -,
87 Sup. Ct. 625 (1967), the United States
Supreme Court was asked to decide whether an attorney's refusal to produce
demanded financial records and to testify in a disciplinary proceeding on
the basis that the records and his testimony would tend to incriminate him
was ground for disbarment. The Court held that the self-incrimination
clause of the fifth amendment had been absorbed in the fourteenth and
protects lawyers as well as other individuals and could not be watered
down by imposing disbarment as a price for asserting it.
The case arose out of a proceeding to discipline the petitioner, a
member of the New York Bar, for professional misconduct. Of the various
charges made against him, the one surviving was his refusal to honor a
subpoena duces tecum demanding that he produce certain financial records
pertaining to cases involving contingent fee compensation which, under a
New York Court Rule,' he was under a duty to preserve. Not only did the
23 Cooley, Torts 29 (2d ed. 1888).
1 Rule IV(6) of the Rules of the Appellate Division, Second Department of the Supreme Court of New York states:

Attorneys for both plaintiff and defendant in the case of any such claim or
,cause of action [claims or actions for personal injuries, property damage, wrongful death, loss of services resulting from personal injuries and claims in connection with condemnation 'or change of grade proceedings] shall preserve, for a
period of at least five years after any settlement or satisfaction of the claim
or cause of action or any judgment thereon or after the dismissal or discontihuance of any action, the pleadings -and other papers pertaining to such claim or
cause of action, including, but not limited to, letters br other data-relating to the

